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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we propose a new security protocol for a wireless sensor network, which is designed for monitoring
long range power transmission lines in smart grid. Part of the monitoring network is composed of optical fiber composite
over head ground wire (OPGW), thus it can be secured with conventional security protocol. However, the wireless sensor
network between two neighboring OPGW gateways remains vulnerable. Our proposed security protocol focuses on the
wireless sensor network part, it provides mutual authentication, data integrity, and data confidentiality for both uplink and
downlink transmissions between the sensor nodes and the OPGW gateway. Besides, our proposed protocol is adaptive
to the dynamic node changes of the monitoring sensor network; for example, new sensors are added to the network, or
some of the sensors are malfunctioning. We further propose a self-healing process using an “i-neighboring nodes” public
key structure and an asymmetric algorithm. We also conduct energy consumption analysis for both general and extreme
conditions to show that our security protocol improves the availability of the monitoring sensor network. Copyright © 2015
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Smart grid applies communication technology to gather
grid operational information by deploying sensors, field
automated devices, and smart meters. Such information
is used to provide automatic control over the power grid.
Therefore, the efficiency, reliability, and sustainability of
the power grid will be enhanced [1–6]. Smart grid enables
quick and accurate detection of the time and location of a
malfunctioning component and informs the operators and
utilities so that proper actions can be applied to prevent a
power failure or to reduce the damage of such failure [7,8].
Smart grid is capable of providing those functions because
of reliable two-way communication networks in parallel
with the power grid system.
The two-way communication networks established in
the grid monitor and control the status of most parts in
the smart grid, for example, power generators, transmis-
sion lines, and substations. Therefore, smart grid is more
efficient and reliable than traditional power grid [9–11].
In this paper, we study the monitoring network over the
transmission line in smart grid. Specifically, the moni-
toring network consists of numerous sensor nodes, data
centers and hierarchical communication links [12]. As the
optical fiber composite overhead ground wire (OPGW)
technology can provide the great advantages for communi-
cations in capacity, effectiveness, reliability, security, and
so on [13], such OPGW has been deployed along the
transmission lines in many places already [14]. However,
because of the attenuation of signal and the cost of equip-
ment, it is impractical to grant access to OPGW for every
sensor node along the monitoring network. Therefore, in
our studied monitoring network, OPGW is assumed to be
accessed by selected nodes, which are referred to as gate-
way nodes. For other intermediate nodes in between two
gateway nodes, they are connected by a lower cost multi-
hop wireless network [15–22]. In fact, this design of smart
grid has been considered by some countries already, for
60 Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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example, the smart grid in China has been allocated a
dedicated spectrum (230 MHz [23,24]) for wireless trans-
mission for this purpose.
Our focus in this paper is the cyber security on the
concerned monitoring and control network of the trans-
mission lines, because it is one of the most important
issues among all requirements of the sensor network for
transmission lines. The wireless portion of the monitor-
ing network must meet the demand of smart grid (e.g.,
latency requirement); it is also important for the sensor
nodes to be energy efficient. We assume that the sensor
nodes are powered by green energy (e.g., solar power) for
two reasons: (i) the transmission line is too powerful to
power a sensor; (ii) it would be more flexible to deploy
and cheaper to maintain the sensor nodes by using green
energy. Therefore, the studied wireless monitoring network
cannot afford expensive or complicated security protocols
for traditional networks.
In this paper, we propose a security protocol for the
wireless portion of the monitoring sensor network, which
uploads the monitoring data (e.g., voltage status, humid-
ity of the environment, etc) of the transmission lines. The
sensor network delivers the status information from the
monitoring point of each sensor node through uplink to
the gateway and then to the data collection center through
OPGW. The control center delivers control information
through the downlink in the similar way. Our proposed
protocol meets both security and reliability requirements
for the wireless portion of the monitoring network. The
proposed protocol consists of several security mechanisms
including authentication of both equipment and messages
transmitted, as well as data encryption for both uplink and
downlink transmissions.
Generally, a protocol designed for a network with com-
plicated topology is more likely to find a new route to avoid
malfunctioning nodes. However, the investigated wireless
sensor network is simply a chain topology, and the main-
tenance of the nodes is hard to pursue. Therefore, how to
maintain reliable communications is a challenge. We pro-
pose a self-healing process to tackle such a challenge based
on a new public key structure of “i-neighboring nodes” and
an asymmetric encryption algorithm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, related work is presented. In Section 3, the stud-
ied wireless monitoring sensor network is illustrated. In
Section 4, a security protocol is proposed. In Section 5,
the proposed protocol is analyzed in details. In Section 6,
the simulation results are presented to demonstrate the
availability of the sensor network for the proposed secu-
rity protocol. In Section 7, the conclusion and future work
are given.
2. RELATED WORK
Many researchers have studied the cyber physical system
of smart grid including data transmission, power manage-
ment, cyber security, and so on [10,15,16,25]. However,
not many research works have been focused on the moni-
toring network of the power line transmission system. Two
types of status are monitored by the high-voltage electri-
cal transmission lines monitoring system, electric current
and line positions. With real-time monitoring, electricity
overload, phase unbalance, fluctuation, and so on can be
avoided or reduced. Some situations such as sagging and
galloping can be tracked by the control center.
Research works that are conducted on the monitor-
ing network focused on monitoring technologies rather
than communications. For example, Ren et. al proposed a
dynamic line rating system to monitor the online sag under
complex climates (e.g., heavy rains, heavy snow, strong
wind, etc.). [26]. Huang et al. proposed an online scheme
to monitor the icing density and type of the transmission
line [27]. Sun et. al proposed a high-voltage transmission
line monitoring system based on magnetoresistive sen-
sors [28], which calculate both the current flow and the
line positions from the magnetic field emnated from the
phase conductors.
Lin et. al proposed a wireless sensor network based on
power transmission line monitoring frame [15]. Specifi-
cally, the authors proposed to establish a wireless mesh
sensor network on each tower. The gateway on a tower is
able to relay data to the gateway on its neighboring tower.
However, network security was not thoroughly studied. In
our work, the focus is on the network security of the long
distance data delivery of the monitoring network. The main
contributions of our work include:
 A new security protocol for transmission line moni-
toring network is proposed.
 The flexibility demand of smart grid is considered; for
example, a sensor node can be added to the network,
or an existing sensor can be ruled out at any time.
 Reliability of the communication is considered.
 Energy efficiency is considered because of limited
power supply of sensor nodes.
3. NETWORK MODEL
Figure 1 shows a typical model of the monitoring net-
work for power transmission lines. The server located in
an operational center performs the short term data storage
and management and also works for the data transmission.
The authentication server (AS) used in initialization pro-
cess and data collection center (DCC) used in both uplink
and downlink processes are also included in the server.
The data aggregation units (DAUs) located on the trans-
mission tower are utilized to collect the sensing data of
the surroundings, for example, humidity, the precipitation,
the range of shake, and so on. A dual-link gateway DAU
(DGD) and a regular DAU are similar, expect that DGD
has access to the optical fiber network, so each DGD serves
as the gateway to the OPGW for wireless network consist-
ing of the DAUs. Our focus is on the multi-hop wireless
sensor network between two DGDs in the rest of the paper.
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Figure 1. Network model of the monitoring network.
Figure 2. Monitoring data uplink transmission model.
Figure 3. Control command downlink transmission model.
The DAUs in a region (between two DGDs) are tagged
from node 1 to node n; the gateway is tagged as node 0
in a region. Every region also has its unique number, so
if the server wants to communicate with a node, it should
find the DGD of the designated node’s region first and
then find the target node. As for the communication mode
and the protocol, we assume a DGD with the following
communication capability.
Figure 2 shows how the monitoring data are uploaded
in the network. In the uplink process, we combine all the
monitoring data of the nodes in a region together to gener-
ate an aggregated message transmitted to DGD (i.e., node
0). Node 0 aggregates its data to the data from other nodes,
but it also adds an extra code to state from which region the
message comes. The uplink transmission consumes more
energy compared with that of the downlink transmission
because of different data sizes. Figure 3 shows the pro-
cess of downlink transmission for control messages. Note
that either broadcast/multi-cast or uni-cast, the size of the
data is much smaller compared with the aggregated data in
uplink transmission. Without loss of generality, we intro-
duce the case of uni-cast. The broadcast/multi-cast case




In the conventional security protocol for such a network
scenario, the message of node i is encrypted using sym-
metric encryption algorithm, and the nodes between node i
and data center are relay nodes. The great advantage of the
conventional protocol is of its simplicity and efficient oper-
ation with a certain extent of security, so it is a good fit for
the wired portion of the monitoring network because of the
high transmission rate and physically secured structures.
However, for the wireless sensor monitoring network, it
is inappropriate to adopt the conventional protocol or
symmetric encryption algorithms because of their low flex-
ibility, scalability, and relevance between every message.
Therefore, we propose a new protocol for the wireless
sensor monitoring network. The proposed security proto-
col uses a lightweight asymmetric encryption algorithm
that each sensor node only occupies temporarily generated
public keys of some neighboring nodes.
In this section, we describe the proposed security proto-
col, which includes authentication of both equipment and
messages, decryption of messages, and solution to the vul-
nerability of the network structure. The proposed security
protocol consists of four parts, namely initialization pro-
cess, uplink data process, downlink command process, and
self-healing process for malfunctioning nodes. The main
task of initialization process is to authenticate every newly
added node and to establish the network route. Moreover,
we need to achieve the key distribution in this process too.
The uplink and downlink command process are designed
for the secure transmission of message in each direction.
The self-healing process for malfunctioning nodes can
improve the reliability of the monitoring sensor network.
4.1. Initialization process
The proposed initialization process addresses the two
issues: (i) to authenticate a newly added node and (ii) to
distribute the corresponding keys securely to the newly
added node and to its neighbors within i hops.
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Definition 1. “i-neighboring nodes” of node k are the
nodes within i-hop to node k.
In our design, we assume that node n stores the pub-
lic keys of its i-neighboring nodes (e.g., PUn˙j, 0 < j 
i < n ). Different i defines the level of flexibility, where the
network is more robust with larger i. For example, if i = 1,
the communication will be broken if an intermediate node
is malfunctioning, but we can continue communication in
the same situation when i = 2 because it is capable of
hopping over the malfunctioning node. However, increas-
ing i leads to a higher transmission energy consumption.
Therefore, i must be appropriate so that it can balance the
reliability and the transmission power consumption of the
wireless sensor network.
For simplicity, we list the keys used by node n in
Table. I. For node n, Kn is the pre-installed key for authen-
tication, and it is known to node n and the AS. PRn is the
private key which is generated and distributed by the AS
during the initialization process. The public keys of node n
and n’s i-neighboring nodes are PUn–i, . . . , PUn+i. More-
over, we specify that PUn–j, 0 < j  i, i < n as backward
keys, which will be used in downlink transmission, and
PUn+j, 0 < j  i, i < n as forward keys, which will be used
in uplink transmission. The generating algorithms of pub-
lic/private keys can be arbitrarily chosen by the AS. Note
that if node n–k does not exist, we assume PUn–k = 0. Dur-
ing normal operation, node n only communicates with its
one-hop neighboring nodes (i.e., n – 1 and n + 1); therefore,
we also define the public keys with one-hop neighboring
nodes (i.e., PUn–1 and PUn+1) as default keys. Kn–1,n and
Kn,n+1 as the communication keys, which are generated
by node n with PRn to authenticated message in transmis-
sion process between node n – 1$ node n, and node n$
node n + 1. It means that node n will communicate with
node n – 1, and node n + 1 when the network is working
properly. But if one of them is broken down, for exam-
ple, node n + 1, the default forward key will be replaced
by PUn+2, and communication key will be updated to
Kn,n+2 too.
After knowing the structure of keys in Figure 4, we
describe the authentication process and the distribution
process of the private keys. We assume that a secure net-
work from node n–1 to node 1 has already been built. Now
a new node n wants to add itself to the network after node
n – 1. It has an authentication key, which is only known to
the AS and n itself. So node n and node n–1 need to achieve
mutual authentication through the AS. They perform a two-
way handshake first. Node n send M0 = Request||n||C0
to node n – 1 and receive M1 = Accept||(n – 1)||C1 from
Table I. Key structure for node n.
Authentication key Kn
Private key PRn
Forward public key PUn, PUn+1 ... PUn+i
Backward public key PUn, PUn–1 ... PUn–i
Communication key Kn–1,n, Kn,n+1
Figure 4. Authentication and private key distribution process.
node n – 1 if M0 is standard. The “Request” and “Accept”
are two given messages used in the authentication process,
which are only known by nodes and AS. It can protect the
communication from forgery to a certain extent before the
message being discovered. Note that “n” is the ID embed-
ded in node both n and the AS. “Ci” is a hashed value used
as a message authentication code for message i. After this
simple handshake, node n will send its authentication mes-
sage M2 = EKn (T + Kn)||n||C2 to node n – 1. To be secure
from replay attack, node n generates a challenge (e.g., a
time stamp or a nonce T). Then node n – 1 forwards the
message to the AS through the intermediate nodes from
n – 2 to node 1, which are simply intermediate nodes with
secure links between node n – 1 and the AS in the authen-
tication process. So the security can be provided as only
n – 1, and the AS are directly involved in the authentica-
tion process. After the AS receives the M2, it decrypts the
message using Kn to obtain T and sends M02 = EKn (T)||C
0
2
back to node n. Node n authenticates the AS by compar-
ing T decrypted from M02 and replies T to the AS. Upon
receiving T , the AS confirms the initialization process of
node n.
After the authentication process, node n should be
added to the network if it is legitimate. The next step is
to distribute corresponding keys. There are two parts of
key distribution which are private key distribution and pub-
lic key distribution. The private key distribution is done
after the authentication process. The AS generates three
messages in this process, that is, M00 = EKn (PRn)||C00,
M01 = EKn (PUn–1)||C01, and M10 = EPUn–1 (PUn)||C10.
The messages are sent to node n–1 first through the security
network consisting of all the authenticated nodes. Node
n – 1 can only decrypt the M10 to obtain the PUn, the pub-
lic key distributed to node n, so that it is informed of which
node is allowed to be added to the network. Node n – 1
relays M00 and M01 to node n after a two-way handshake.
The M3 = Request||(n – 1)||C3 and M4 = Allow||n||C4 are
utilized in the handshake similar to the previous process.
The M00 contains the private key of node n, PRn, which is
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:60–71 © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 63
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Figure 5. Public key distribution process.
distributed by the AS and the M01 contains the public key
of node n – 1, PUn–1, which is utilized to inform node n
that node n – 1 is creditable too.
The public key distribution is shown in Figure 5. As
node n and n – 1 can authenticate each other now, the
message M5 = EPUn–1 (PUn||Request)||C5 is utilized as a
“hello” to node n – 1. Node n – 1 will authenticate the
PUn with the public key from the AS to ensure the iden-
tity of the sender. Then it will reply a series message
M0j = EPUn (PUn–j)||C0j, 2  j  i, i < n, to node n
to distribute the public key. Now, the public key distribu-
tion of node n has been finished but we have to update
the public key of node n – 2 to node n – i (transmitting
PUn from node n – 1 to node n – i one by one) using
the process between node n – 1 and node n – 2. Messages
M6 = EPUn–2 (PUn||Request)||C6 (from node n – 1 to node
n – 2) and M7 = EPUn–1 (Accept)||C7 (from node n – 2 to
node n – 1) are responsible for the public key update. The
proposed initialization process not only adds a new node to
the secure network, but also updates all the keys to provide
high security.
4.2. Uplink data process
After a secure network from node n to the DCC has been
built after the initial process, the network for monitoring
data transmission is active. The message sent from node
k to node k – 1 is Mk,0 = Mn||Mn–1|| : : : ||Mk ||M
0
k ||Ck. The
‘0’ behind ‘k’ in the Mk,0 is the indicator of transmis-
sion direction, for example, ‘0’ stands for uplink trans-
mission. The Mk,0 consists three parts. The first part is
Mn||Mn–1|| : : : ||Mk, where Mi is the monitoring data of
node i, which has been encrypted; it is appended to the
encrypted message of node k to the message from the node
before it. M0k = Mn + Mn–1 + : : : + Mk (“+” stands for XOR
function), which is utilized for generating message authen-
tication code and encryption process in the next node, node
k – 1. The last part Ck is the message authentication code
generated by Mk and the communication key between node
k and node k – 1, Kk,k–1. The message authentication code
is for the data integrity.
After explaining the structure of the message, we then
present how to transmit a message in the uplink pro-
cess for a normal situation using node n and n – 1 as an
Figure 6. Uplink data process.
example shown in Figure 6. Before transmitting the mes-
sage Mn,0 to node n – 1, node n processes a two-way
handshake with node n – 1 to authenticate node n – 1 and
make sure it is operating properly. The “hello” message
Mh,0 = EPUn–1 (EPRn (hello)||n) is sent from node n to node
n – 1. The “D&I” stands for decryption and integrity val-
idation for simplicity. Node n – 1 decrypts the Mh,0 using
its private key PRn–1 first to get “n”, so it knows the mes-
sage from node n. Then node n – 1 decrypts EPRn (hello)
with PUn to further verify the sender authentication. Then
node n – 1 replies node n with the message Mr,0 =
EPUn (EPRn–1 (response)||(n – 1)). Node n can authenticate
the n–1 through the same way. After node n authenticating
the n–1, it runs function FEn to generate the Mn,0 and then
sends the Mn,0 to node n – 1. The node n – 1 will do a mes-
sage authentication first after receiving Mn,0 to check data
integrity. It will generate a message authentication code C0n
using the middle part of the message M0n and Kn,n–1 stored
in itself. If C0n is equal to Cn, which is generated by node n,
then the transmission is successful. Then, the node n–1 will
repeat the same process to transmit aggregated messages
to node n – 2.
For node i, its function FEi is illustrated in Figure 7. The
monitoring data of node i, Di, is conducted an XOR (
L
)
operation with the M0i+1 first to enhance avalanche effect.
Node n will use an initial vector IV , which is known by
both node n and DCC indicating that it is the first node in
the uplink process. Then node i encrypts the result with the
public key of node i, PUi to generate Mi = EPUi (Di+M
0
i+1).
In public-key cryptograph, the message encrypted by the
public key PUi can just be decrypted by the corresponding
private key PRi, and PRi is known by node i and the DCC
only. So it can ensure the security of data. Afterwards, we
let M0i = M
0
i+1 + Mn to generate a new intermediate mes-
sage for node i (M0n = 0 + Mn = Mn if it is the first node of
the network). Node i also generates a hash value Ci based
on M0i and the communication key Ki,i–1 so that the next
node can authenticate the message. Then Mn is XORed
with Mi, and the result is compared with M0i to ensure
the data integrity. At last, Mi, M0i , and Ci are appended to
Mn||Mn–1|| : : : ||Mi+1 as Mi,0.
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Figure 7. FEi function for node i.
4.3. Downlink command process
The downlink process is different from the uplink pro-
cess mainly in three ways. (i) In the uplink process, we
need to transmit the monitoring data of all nodes to the
DCC, but the control command from DCC can be uni-
cast, multicast, or broadcast. (ii) The monitoring data can
be sent in a given schedule, but the control command
can be sent sparsely. (iii) The monitoring data are rela-
tively large in data size, but the control command can be
very short and the same size or content to different nodes.
The different characteristics between uplink and downlink
communications requires a different security procedures,
which can transmit control command securely and timely
to the designated node for the downlink. The proposed
security protocol for downlink process is about to be not
only simpler but also secure compared with the protocol
for uplink process. The first change is the structure of
message. We have stated that the message transmitted from
node k is Mk,0 = Mn||Mn–1|| : : : ||Mk ||M
0
k ||Ck, which con-
tains the data and authentication message of all the nodes
before it. Now, we examine the control command, which
is to be sent to node k as Mk,1 = EPUk (CMk)||k||Ck. The
first part of Mk,1 is the encrypted command, and the mid-
dle part is the ID of the receiving node. These two parts are
fixed after the Mk,1 is generated. The last part Ck is gener-
ated as an authentication code, so it will be changed after
the message sent from one node to the other. The trans-
mitting route is also changed as we note in the network
model section. The simple structure and distribution way
provided by the encryption and authentication can ensure
timely and securely transmission to designated nodes
in the downlink.
For example, if the DCC wants to send message Mk,1 to
node k using the downlink command process, Mk,1 is sent
hop by hop because of network structure. Similar to the
uplink process, the sender and the receiver perform a simi-
lar two-way handshake. Then the receiver node i processes
the steps shown in Figure 8. The node i will separate the ID
part first and compare the ID with its own after authenti-
cating the Ck generated by the sender node i – 1. If they are
the same, that is to say i = k, it will decrypt the EPUk (CMk)
to get the control command CMk. If it is different, the node
i will continue to transmit the message Mk,1 to node i + 1
after it updates the Ck using the EPUk (CMk)||k and Ki+1,i
and generate the new Mk,1.
For this process, we do message authentication in every
node to make sure the validity of transmitted control
Figure 8. Downlink process of node i.
command message, and we do not need to decrypt if the
node is not the designated receiver. This design can make
the transmission process more efficient.
4.4. Self-healing process for
malfunctioning nodes
The monitoring sensor network could suffer from low reli-
ability because the communications will be interrupted
even if there is only one malfunctioning node. To enhance
the reliability, we propose the i-neighboring public key
structure. If there are some malfunctioning nodes, we first
confirm which nodes can work well and build a new link
based on them as shown in Figure 9. We assume that the
node from n – 1 to n – k (1 < k < i) do not operate prop-
erly for some reasons, for example, being compromised
by an attacker, being damaged due to bad weather, and
so on. Node n must be informed with the status of those
malfunctioning nodes and build a new link with the node
n – k – 1.
In the uplink process, data transmission starts after a
two-way handshake. As node n – 1 has been malfunction-
ing, it cannot reply the “hello” message Mh,0 from node
n in the given way. Node n knows that node n – 1 is
not operating properly because there is error response or
no response. So, it will generate a new “hello” message
Mh,1 = EPUn–2 (EPRn (hello)||n) and then sends it to node
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:60–71 © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 65
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Figure 9. Self-healing process.
n–2. The communication can not be built until node n–k–1
because all the previous nodes are malfunctioning. Node
n – k – 1 decrypts the Mh,k = EPUn–k–1 (EPRn (hello)||n)
and realizes that the “hello” message did not come from
its default node n – k because the ID “n” in the Mh,k.
So, it will decrypt EPRn (hello) using PUn stored by itself.
If it finds the message is impeccable, it will update its
default forward key from PUn–k to PUn and generate
a new communication key Kn,n–k–1 with both PUn and
PRn–k–1. Then it will reply the node n with the message
Mr,k = EPUn (EPRn–k–1 (response)||(n – k – 1)). After receiv-
ing and handling Mr,k, the node n can see that the available
node next to itself is node n – k – 1, so it will update its
default backward key from PUn–1 to PUn–k–1 and gener-
ate the communication key Kn,n–k–1 too, so that it does not
need to inquire the malfunctioning node in every time’s
uplink transmission. After that, the communication contin-
ues in the new network route node n, node n – k – 1, node
n – k – 2, : : : , node 1.
The similar process is applied to downlink process. If a
malfunctioning node appears, we can recover the original
route by doing an initial process after the malfunctioning
nodes repaired. In the process, larger i in the i-neighboring
public key structure makes it a more reliable system. How-
ever, in practice, because of limited transmission rage of
the nodes as well as low possibility of multi-node mal-
functioning occurrence, we usually apply i = 2 or i = 3
at most.
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security of the proposed security relies on the actual
cryptographic operations (e.g., encryption algorithms, hash
functions, etc.) that are applied to the security. Without
loss of generality, we assume that cryptographic operations
applied are computationally secure unless corresponding
keys are compromised. For simplicity, we briefly dis-
cuss the security based on the aforementioned assumption
without rigorous mathematical proofs.
5.1. Security analysis of initialization
process
In authentication process, the main task is to ensure the
pre-installed authentication key of the unauthenticated
node to be sent to the AS securely. If the newly added
node is node n, we just need to establish the secure com-
munications between node n and node n – 1 because the
network between node n – 1 and AS is secure. We per-
form a handshake first as a simple sender authentication.
As node n has not been authenticated by AS and it can-
not ensure whether node n – 1 has been authenticated, the
given message “Request” in M0 and “Accept” in M1 can
do little contribution for equipment authentication as these
messages should be known by every legitimate DAU. We
use authentication key Kn and time stamp T encrypted
each other and combine them to generate the authentica-
tion message of node n, so the message cannot be forged
because the Kn is just known by node n and AS. The replay
attack does not work because of the time stamp T . Cer-
tainly, every message has its message authentication code
Ci generated by hash operation to ensure the data integrity.
In the key distribution part, we need to accomplish the
key distribution when a new node is added to the network.
The conventional symmetric key based protocol does not
meet the requirement of the wireless sensor monitoring
network very well because each communication link of
such wireless sensor monitoring network must be kept
independently secure. Therefore, our proposed protocol
and key structure are based on an asymmetric encryption
algorithm. In order to simplify the process, after node n
and node n – 1 finishing mutual authentication with each
other through the AS, then they will process the remain-
ing tasks locally. The private key of node n and public keys
of node n and its i-neighboring nodes are sent through a
secure tunnel (secured with the authentication key). The
entire message used in the process is encrypted with the
public key of the receiver for confidentiality. The message
authentication code is used in every message to provide
data integrity.
5.2. Security analysis of uplink process
The sender initiates a handshake before actual data trans-
mission for mutual authentication. The main part of uplink
process is the encryption function FEi. In this function, we
aggregate the raw data with previous incoming data first to
decrease the relevance of the message of every node and
encrypt it with the public key of node i so that it can only
be decrypted only by the DCC, which has the private key of
node i (besides node i). Data integrity is protected by two
operations. First, mn is XORed with Mi and compared with
M0i to make sure that Mn||Mn–1||...||Mi+1 is not manipulated.
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Second, message authentication code Ci further authenti-
cate the integrity of M0i . Message authentication code is not
generated for all the messages so that the overhead can be
reduced for shorter delay.
5.3. Security analysis of downlink process
In the downlink process, the proposed design focuses on
the efficiency while the security is guaranteed at the same
time. First, message authentication code is generated by
every node using its communication key, it provides data
integrity and authenticates the sender. Forgery and data
manipulation can hardly be achieved without knowing the
communication key, which is generated by the private key
of the receiver and public key of the sender. When the
control command is transmitted to a specific node, confi-
dentiality is provided by encrypting the message with the
public key of the receiver.
5.4. Security analysis of self-healing
process
Because of the asymmetric encryption algorithm in the
proposed protocol, public keys are shared with other nodes.
In this way, a node can communicate with others by dis-
tributing its public key to others, and the confidentiality is
ensured as its private key is just known by the sever and
itself. Furthermore, it enables the self-healing function of
the network because of malfunctioning nodes. The security
measure is the same as the uplink and downlink processes;
it processes one more handshake after the default hand-
shake failed and then generates a new communication by
updating the key. So the security can be provided with
more reliability.
6. AVAILABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the availability of the net-
work with our proposed security protocol considering both
energy consumption and end-to-end delay. We also show
that it is practical to recover the network with a few
malfunctioning nodes in many network scenarios.
6.1. Energy consumption analysis
In Table II, we list the key parameters for the ease of
analysis.
Table II. Key parameters.
M packet length after channel coding
L data length
R physical layer transmission data rate
i SINR of node i
pi transmission power of node i
hi,j path gain of node i at node j
SINR, signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
Compared with the energy consumption of data-
processing such as encryption and authentication, the
energy consumption of data transmission is much larger.
If we choose to hop over malfunctioning nodes, the com-
putational cost may reduce because of the reduced amount
of data. Therefore, we mainly discuss the energy con-
sumption of data transmission. Let each data packet of the
proposed protocol contain L bit information. With chan-
nel coding, the total size of each packet is M > L bits.
The physical transmission rate is R bit/s. Considering node
i, the probability of correct reception is q(i), where i
is the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the
receiver. Assuming that all the transmissions are statisti-
cally independent, then we have E[n] = 1/q(i). Therefore,
we can get the total transmission time Tt, required for





With the transmitted power pi watts and the length of
information L, we can find the transmitter efficiency U,
which means how much Joule we need when we transmit
one bit message correctly. We can also substitute the basic
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When we calculate i, we first make an assumption that
the p are identical for all nodes. Then we can get a general







where N is the processing gain. For simplicity, path gain h





where the Gt is the gain of transmitting antenna, and the Gr
is the gain of receiving antenna. The  is wavelength, and
d = S/n is the distance between two neighboring nodes. We
then relax Equation (4) with the assumption that noise is
only from background, the interference is from node i + 1







Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:60–71 © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 67
DOI: 10.1002/sec
Secure protocol for smart grid monitoring X. Zhang et al.
Figure 10. Energy efficiency of different i.
After combining Equation (2) with Equation (3),
Equation (5), and Equation (6), we can find the energy cost
of every bit. In the original case, we assume that N = 5,
L = 192, M = 240, R = 106 bps and p = 200 mW. Receiver
noise power spectral density is assumed to be 10–21 W/Hz
(which produces a noise power of 2 = 10–15 W in a
receiver with 1 MHz), transmitting antenna gain Gt = 1 dB,
receiving antenna gain Gr = 2 dB, and total distance of
the line S = 20 km with 20 nodes deployed in the net-
work. Then we have the energy efficiency for every bit is
U = 2.5602  10–4 mJ. Because of the chain topology, the
node neighboring to the gateway consumes the maximum
energy among all the nodes, that is, Et = 1.23 mJ, which
can be achieved by renewable energy (e.g., solar power).
One of the contributions of our proposed protocol is the
scheme to deal with the failure of intermediate nodes by
hopping over the malfunctioning nodes. We prove that the
method is feasible to energy consumption. For handling
the problem, we propose “i-neighboring nodes” public key
structure. We first simulate a case for increasing is from
1 to 10 when transmitter power p = 200 mW. the results
are shown in Figure 10. We can see that the cost of energy
increase a lot with i increasing. Compared with the result
of the original case before, Et = 1.23 mJ, and i changes to
2 (there is 1 malfunctioning intermediate node); the energy
efficiency of every bit will be U = 6.006  10–4 mJ,
so the maximum energy consumption of transmitting will
amplify to Et = (20 – 1)  240  6.006  10–4 = 2.74 mJ.
It seems not so large but when the i is bigger, we can
see a surge of energy cost. For example, when i is 7, the
maximum energy cost will be more than 672 mJ. That is
to say, if we use the fixed transmitter power, i cannot be
arbitrarily large.
As a solution to this issue, we propose to increase the
transmitter power at the node one-hop away from the mal-
functioning node. In Figure 11, we take i = 1 and i = 2
as examples. The line of i = 1 is horizontal because there
is no malfunctioning node. The line i = 2 is always above
i = 1, that is to say we should spend more energy to hop
over the malfunctioning node. But we can also find when
Figure 11. Energy efficiency with different p when i=1 and i=2.
Figure 12. Energy efficiency with different p when i from 1
to 10.
p = 280 mW and the energy consumption for every bit
can be minimum at the same time. So, the result has con-
firmed that we can reduce the energy cost by increasing
the transmitter power. However, there is still a limit of
both transmitter power and energy consumption, so that we
should choose an appropriate i. To find the i, we simulate
for i = 1 to 10 with different p, as shown in Figure 12.
Table III shows the transmitter power with minimum
energy consumption and the maximum energy consump-
tion for one node with i from 1 to 10. The maximum
energy cost for each node shows that if all the malfunc-
tioning nodes neighboring to the gateway, then we should
send entire message of all remaining nodes in the wire-
less network to the gateway directly. When i  3, both
the transmitter power with minimum energy consumption
and the maximum energy consumption for one node are
less than half of the original circumstance, so the DAU can
work regularly. If i = 4 or i = 5, the equipment may work in
a high pressure of both transmitter power and energy con-
sumption, which is considered as the extreme cases. When
i  6, we can see that the maximum energy consumption
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Table III. The minimum transmission power and maximum energy cost for one node with different i.
number of i p with min energy cost(mW) ratio max energy cost for one node (mJ) ratio
i = 1 200 1.00 1.23 1.00
i = 2 280 1.40 1.91 1.55
i = 3 370 1.85 2.40 1.95
i = 4 440 2.20 2.67 2.17
i = 5 480 2.40 2.79 2.27
i = 6 520 2.60 2.82 2.29
i = 7 550 2.75 2.78 2.26
i = 8 570 2.85 2.69 2.19
i = 9 590 2.95 2.57 2.09
i = 10 610 3.05 2.42 1.97
may decrease because of the decreasing of transmission
data, but the transmitter power will increase continuously
and may exceed the sustainable limit of equipment. In sum-
mary, we should utilize i = 1 to 3 “i-neighboring nodes”
public key structure design in general and i = 4 or i = 5
in some special situation, for example, there is ample solar
energy and in tough environment.
6.2. End-to-end delay analysis
As we use asymmetric encryption algorithm, the data pro-
cessing delay may be large. So we should consider the
delay of data processing and transmission at the same time.
In Equation (1), we have calculated the transmission time
for one node. Now, we assume that the first q nodes in a
total of 20 nodes are functional and others are malfunc-
tioning, we can get the maximum value of the transmission
delay for different i. It is easy to find that the first q–1 nodes
have the same delay for one packet, Tt1 and the transmis-
sion time for one packet of node q is Tt2 (Tt1 = Tt2 when
i = 1). The delay of data process Tp is the same for every
node, and we can get q = 21 – i easily. So the total delay T
can be expressed as
T =
(21 – i)(20 – i)
2
Tt1 + (21 – i)Tt2 + (21 – i)Tp (7)
Tt1 = 0.25 ms can be found based on the settings. Tt2
is calculated as a function of i with the parameters and
results in 5.1. For Tp, in our proposed security protocol,
we select the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm
for encryption, which has the key length of 1024 bits
and MD5 to generate the message authentication code.
From [21] and [30], we see that the processing time of
RSA and MD5 is 1.65 ms/Byte and 0.11 s/Byte respec-
tively. So, Tp = 192/8  (1.65 + 0.11  10–3) ' 39.6 ms
is also a fixed value. We can get the total delay T with
variable i, as shown in Figure 13. In this figure, we can
find that the delay will decrease when the i increases
because of the slow traditional RSA algorithm. More
malfunctioning nodes also indicate that less encryption
is processed.
Figure 13. End-to-end delay with different i.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a security protocol for a wire-
less sensor network that monitors transmission lines in
smart grid. The proposed protocol provides authentication
for equipment and data, message encryption for uplink
transmission, and command encryption for downlink trans-
mission. We also proposed an “i-neighboring nodes” pub-
lic key structure and using asymmetric algorithm to make
the network more adaptive. The new protocol is adaptive
to the network change so that a new sensor node can be
added at anytime. Moreover, we proposed a self-healing
process using “i-neighboring nodes” public key structure
for the sensor network to maintain network connectivity
when there are some malfunctioning nodes. We further
conducted security analysis to show how the proposed pro-
tocol protect the wireless sensor network in every step.
We also analyzed the energy consumption and end-to-end
delay. The results showed that our protocol would enhance
the reliability of the wireless sensor monitoring network
when choosing appropriate i with “i-neighboring nodes”.
The end-to-end delay simulation results showed us that we
may further decrease the end-to-end delay by hopping over
some nodes on purpose.
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